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Abstract 
We test the Barro-Gordon model extended to allow for persistence 
in unemployment. First, we build an index o� central bank independence and 
measures of persistence, and then we compare them with inflation 
perfor.mance in DEeD countries. Our results show, as theory predicts, a 
robust negative relationship between the degree of independence and the 
level and variance of inflation. However, the extended model is not strongly 
endorsed by the data since the link between inflation and unemployment 
persistence is weak. The reason is that there eocists a strong correlation 
between unemployment persistence and independence. This may have 
important implications for the design of an antinflationary policy. 

I.-INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of rational expectations into economic analysis has 
deprived the Phillips curve of much of its attractiveness , since it implies that 
only inflation surprises can have effects on unemployment, and then only in 
the short run. 
Strategic models of monetary policy under the new paradigm (Kydland 
& Prescott (1977) and Barro & Gordon (1983» went further when they 
showed that , if monetary authorities care about unemployment , there exists 
an incentive to generate inflation J despite its ineffectiveness. This 
incentive , when internalised by agents, introduces an inflationary bias into 
the economy . Rogoff ( 1985) showed that this bias could be reduced if the 
government delegates monetary policy to an independent central bank with 
a greater preference for low inflation . 
The attractiveness of an independent central bank has gradually come 
to permeate policymaking ,  supported by the antinflationary success of the 
Bundesbank , epitome of monetary independence. In recent years an 
institutional revolution has taken place in the way monetary policy is 
conducted , with central banks being given more independence . The design 
of the future European Central Bank is a good example of this. 
Worries about inflation extend to high unemployment levels and their 
persistence. Intuitively, one would think that the more persistent is 
unemployment, the greater the ability of monetary policy to influence its 
level in the short and , even , in the long run. Thus, persistence may have 
important effects on monetary policy management, even if the roots of 
persistence lie mainly in the functioning of the labour market . 
These considerations have been formalised by several authors 
(Lockwood & Phillipipoulos (1 994) , Jonsson ( 1995») by extending the basic 
Barra-Gordon model to introduce unemployment persistence. However, their 
results show that monetary policy in the new context , far from being more 
effective, increases the inflationary bias. The reason is that agents perceive 
that unemployment persistence increases the incentive to generate· 
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inflationary surprises. since persistence prolongs the effects of such 
surprises . 
In this paper , we wish to explore empirically the link between 
unemployment persistence, central bank independence (CBI) and inflation 
derived from the extended Barro-Gordon model , which is presented in the 
next section . The analysis covers most of the OECD countries for the period 
1973-91 . By the end of the period central banks in many countries were 
being given more independence. 
The negative correlation between CBr and inf1ation has been extensively 
and succesfully tested (see, for instance , Alesina & Summers ( 1 993) ) . 
However, the concept of CBI is difficult to define and the measures designed 
to capture the effective degree of CBI, are necessarily subject to a large 
degree of arbitrariness . Therefore , our first goal has been to construct a 
'index of indices' taking into account all the factors considered by the 
literature in order to obtain , if possible, a more objective measure . 
By contrast, the effects of unemployment persistence on inflatiQ&have 
not, as yet , been explored , at least in the current context.  In order to do 
so, we first need to construct a measure of persistence. 
The empirical results are presented in section 111. They show that the 
extended model is not endorsed by the empirical evidence, but an interesting 
relationship is unveiled between independence and unemployment 
persistence, whose implications will be developed in the conclusions. 
2.-THE MODEL 
The main consequence of introducing unemployment persistence into a 
strategic model of monetary policy is to transform the static setting of Barra 
and Gordon ( 1 983) into a dynamic setting . The resolution of this model is 
attributable to Lockwood & Phillippopoulos (1994) . They contemplate an 
infinite horizon , which results in strong restrictions on the parameters and 
in a highly complex solution . Hence, we have opted here, following Jonsson 
( 1995) , for a two-period model, which yields the basic intuitive features in 
a much simpler framework . 
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2.1 . -Unemployment persistence 
There are several models to explain unemployment persistence. They are 
usually based on labour market rigidity; in particular our specification 
derives from the 'insiders-outsiders' model of Blanchard & Summers ( 1 986). 
In this model J wage bargaining is carried out by trade unions in wich 
employed workers insiders have more power . In the bargaining, trade unions 
unilaterally fix the nominal wage (w,) J and firms then choose the 
corresponding employment , according to the foHowing labour demand curve : 
n,=- (w,-p,)+IJ, [1) 
where the variables are expressed in logs, � is employment, P. is the price 
level and '1. is a supply disturbance . Rational expectations are assumed , so 
that for any variable x ,  x,e=E,.IX,. 
The trade union will choose the nominal wage which minimises the 
expected deviations from the desired employment level , denoted by fi,: 
Min,. E(n,-ft,)' 
subject to [1J. The resolution of this optimization problem yields a nominal 
wage of 
WI=PI·-fi, 
Susbstituting this expression into [1] and adding and substracting P._I' 
equilibrium employment is: 
where n is the inflation rate . 
The co-existence of insiders and outsiders in the labour market 
influences the choice of the desired level of employment fi, . While outsiders 
worry exclusively about employment, insiders , who already have a job, tend 
to care more about the purchasing power of their wage. Since, as seen in the 
previous expression,  the real wage is a decreasing function of the desired 
employment level, this group will simply aim to maintain the current level of 
employment . Therefore, fi, is determined by the foHowing expression . 
ft,=6n,.,+(1-6 )I 
where �_I is employment at the start of the previous period (Le. the number 
of insiders) , 1 is the workforce (assumed to be fixed) and O$;8�1 is the power 
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of insiders in t�e bargaining process. When the desired employment level is 
substituted in the previous equation and we rewrite it in terms of 
unemployment (u=l-n), we get the following Phillips curve: 
u,=8u,.,-(n,-n,')-IJ, [2) 
We note that persistence in unemployment depends positively on the 
value that e takes. Secondly, we observe that the natural unemployment rate 
is determined by the past level of unemployment. 
It is convenient at this point to show that wage rigidity is proportional 
to the degree of persistence in unemployment .  Two different concepts of 
rigidity are relevant. Nominal wage rigidity (NWR) is defined as the increase 
in inflation required to reduce unemployment. In our context inflation 
increases are associated with monetary surprises, so that we can define 
nominal wage rigidity as NWR =-lim._au,.,.! d( n, -n;'). Usually, real wage 
rigidity (RWR) 
r e q u i r e d  t o  
is measured by 
r e d u c e  t h e  
computing the reduction in 
u nemployment l e v e l ,  
real wages 
t h a t  is, 
RWR =lim • ..-c1u, • •  ! d(w, -p,) . The lower the inflation increase (real wage 
decrease) required to reduce unemployment, the higher will be nominal 
(real) wage rigidity. 
In our model, the Phillips curve shows that monetary surprises reduce 
not only current but also future unemployment, due to persistence. rhus, 
the overall effect of an inflation surprise on unemployment is 
-1-0-02-0"- . . .  =_(1-8)"1, which -as an absolute value- constitutes the degree 
of nominal wage rigidity. Further, in the expression for the nominal wage 
above, we can observe that a monetary surprise reduces real wages in the 
same proportion. Thus, computing the implicit derivative in the case of the 
real rigidity we get 
RWR=NWR =_
I
_ 
1 -8  
where wage rigidity (both nominal and real) is an increasing function of 
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unemployment persistenceili. 
2. 2 . -Model solution 
The arguments of the Government's loss function are its objectives: 
inflation (n) and unemployment (u). The Government chooses the inflation 
rate in each period (n"nz) to minimise the value of its loss function, where 
we have assumed -without loss of generality- a discount rate equal to unity: 
Min,..d L, = L.+� = [n.z+Au.z]+[n/+Au/] 
subject to the Phillips curve. 
As stressed above, past inflationary surprises affect current 
unemployment and the loss function, so that we face an intertemporal 
optimising problem!ll . The solution procedure consists in solving 
backwards. At the beginning of the second period, trade unions fix their 
wage , taking into account their expected inflation for t=2 and once the 
supply disturbance is observed, the Government chooses the inflation level. 
Trade unions inflation expectations are obtained by optimising the expected 
loss function for the Government in the second period (Lz), subject to [2]. 
Since expectations are rational, expected inflation is 
RZf=l8u. 
Substituting this expression in Lz 
and optimising , we arrive at the 
optimal inflation in period 2 :  
(3) 
where the asterisk refers to optimal values. Optimal unemployment is 
obtained by substituting this expression into the Phillips curve: 
dl-Labour market models usually contain a link between real wage rigidity 
and persistence (Alogoskoufis & Manning (1988) ) ,  but the link between 
nominal wage rigidity and persistence is not straightforward. In our model, 
with no nominal inertia , these two concepts are equivalent (See Layard et al . 
(1991), p .  98, for a more detailed exposition of these concepts) . 
Ill-With no unemployment persistence 8=0, the solution is identical for 
each period and the problem becomes a game repeated period by period. 
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U,' =8u, - (1 +A y' 'I, (4) 
Since optimal inflation in period 2 depends on first period unemployment, 
optimal policy in period one must take this into account, and trade unions will 
form their expectations accordingly J by minimising the expected loss function 
for both periods . Since E,[L,)=E,[E,[L,ll=E,[n",+Au",). it follows that: 
Min" E, [L,+L,)=E, [(n,'+ Au,')+(n",+ AU''')] 
Substituting (2-4) into the loss function, we can derive the first order 
conditions . Substituting again (3,4) and applying rational expectations, we 
obtain expected inflation for the first period : 
n',=AO(l+8'(l+A) )u, [5] 
The Government chooses the inflation rate after observing the supply 
shock and taking into account [5]: 
Min,.. L.+E, [L1l=n.2+ lu/+E.l nOzz+ AU '\1 
Substituting (2-5) and minimising, optimal inflation at t=1 is determined 
by the following expressiontll: 
.. 0' n,'= .. O[ 1 +8(1 +") 1u,,-_ [1 +--.J'1, 
1 +A 1 + .. 0' 
(6) 
When 6=0 (corresponding to the model with no persistence) the 
inflationary bias drops out .  The existence of persistence creates an incentive 
to generate inflation , arising from the fact that current reductions in 
unemployment have lasting effect on future unemployment levels . This 
incentive is perceived by agents when forming their expectations , as we can 
observe by noting that the optimal expected inflation is equal to the agents' 
expectation , nO'. (the inflationary bias of the economy). Further, 
unemployment persistence also involves higher inflation variability .  
Finally, i t  is worth stressing that the effects of persistence in 
unemployment are qualitatively equivalent to those of A.: the larger the 
relative weight of unemployment in the government loss function, the higher 
the inflationary bias and inflation variability. Taking the first and second 
(II -Substituting (6) into the Phillips curve we can also obtain 
unemployment in the initial period: 
u,' =8u,,-[ (1 +A) (1 +AO') r' 'I, 
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moments in (6) and differentiating with respect to the relevant parameters, 
we get: 
aE[n] 
__ ' =[8+6'O.+6(1+A))]UII)0 aA 
aE[n,] 
___ =2A8(1+Alu,,)0 
as 
4A '8(1 +6'+1.8')' , 
__ -'-, __ .,.,.:,. 0,)0 
( 1  +1.)'( 1  +1.8')' 
To sum up, the extension of the Barra-Gordon model in order to 
introduce persistence in unemployment shows that higher levels of 
persistence increase the inflationary bias of the economy and the variability 
of inflation ,  in much the same way as A, the relative weight of unemployment 
in the Government loss function. 
3. -EMPIRICAl. EVIDENCE 
The model is tested using a cross-section analysis of nineteen aCDE 
countries for the period 1973-911011 , with quarterly data . Data on inflation 
levels , the degree of unemployment persistence (6) and the value of A are 
required. 
3 . I-CBI as a proxy for A 
The parameter A is not directly observable and it must be proxied by a 
measurable variable which is closely related to i t .  Rogoff (85) showed in the 
Barra-Gordon context , that an independent Central Bank would choose a 
lower value for A than the Government . There are good reasons for this 
besides the theoretical reasons advanced in his work. A Central Bank whose 
explicit goal is price stability and with enough formal and effective 
independence to isolate itself from the political cycle, will naturally have a 
higher relative aversion to inflation (lower A) than a Government which must 
in a relatively short period satisfy voters for whom employment is a primary 
loll-The excluded OEeD countries are Mexico , Turkey (hyperinflation 
would be problematic to deal with) , New Zealand and Greece (their 
unemployment series is too short robusta de persistencia) , and Portugal, 
whose labour market is peculiar (ver Blanchard & Jimeno ( 1995» . 
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concern. 
Therefore, the degree of CBI becomes an adequate proxy for A., and we 
expect to find a negative relationship between CBI  and inflation . When one 
attempts to test this relationship empirically , the first problem is the 
definition and measurement of CBI.  The literature provides a battery of 
indices , but none of them is free from criticism, because they are 
intrinsically arbitrary(�) . 
Our solution to this problem has been to construct an index of indices 
which allows all the factors considered to be taken into account. Table 1 sums 
up our approach, presenting the values for every country, homogenised 
according to the criterion described in the annex; higher degrees of 
independence are associated with higher values . The last column displays the 
mean value of these measures , which we will use in our analysis . 
For the considered sample which, as we have underlined, does not 
convey the institutional changes in the beginning of the nineties , we can 
observe that Germany always appears at the top of the league and Spain is 
usually placed at the bottom(/' .  In general, the indices are fairly consistent, 
but some countries (Australia, Canada, Italy) show a large dispersion. This 
fact reflects the arbitrariness of the measures and justifies our approach. 
3 . 2 .  -Unemployment persistence 
A series is said to be persistent when shocks in one period affect the 
level of the series for several periods . We can find ip. the literature various 
measures based on two different approaches : the gain function in the 
differenced series (Campbell & Mankiw, 1987) and the limit of the variance 
ratio, proposed by Cochrane ( 1988 ) . 
(�'-The annex contains a a description of each index . 
(1')_As Fern!indez de Lis ( 1996) shows , after the Law of Autonomy for the 
Bank of Spain in 1994, the position of Spain shifts to the top of the league . 
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Table 2. STANDARISED MEASURES OF PERSISTENCE 
ARIMA A20 V20 AVERAGE 
Spain 1 (I) I (I) I (I) 1 (I) 
United Kingdom .88 (2) .88 (2) .51 (3) .70 (2) 
Ireland .66 (3) .76 (3) .49 (4) .60 (4) 
Germany .56 (4) .59 (5) .37 (6) .47 (5) 
Belgium .55 (5) .71 (4) .65 (2) .64 (3) 
Denmark .52 (6) .43 (8) .20 (9) .34 (8) 
Canada .50 (7) .41 (8) .18 (10) .32 (9) 
USA .49 (8) .38 (10) .15 (II) .29 (10) 
Netherlands .47 (9) .49 (7) .37 (7) .42 (6) 
Finland .44 (10) .32 (13) .15(12) .27 (12) 
Australia .37 (II) .34 (12) .14 (13) .25 (13) 
France .34 (12) .52 (6) .38 (5) .40 (7) 
Sweden .33 (13) .37 (II) .22 (8) .28 (11) 
Luxemburg .29 (14) .17(19) .04 (19) .14 (17) 
Austria .25 (IS) .31 (14) .14(13) .21 (14) 
Norway .22 (16) .22 (16) .08 (16) .15 (16) 
Italy .20 (17) .21 (17) .07 (17) .14 (18) 
Japan .17 (18) .29 (15) .14 (14) .19(15) 
Switzerland .00 (19) .18(18) .05 (19) .07 (19) 
Note. The cells gIve the value of each measure for each country. The 
ranking of each eountry according to each measure is given in brackets (1 
correspons to the country with most persistence and 19 that with least ) . The 
final column gives a weighted average of this three measures . 
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Since none of the approaches is superior to the rest we present our 
results for three different indicators (ARIMA, A20, V20) and we will use the 
mean of the three . The first two indicators are biased in the gain function 
and the third in the variance ratio . The theoretical concepts relating to 
persistence and a description of the indicators appear in the annex . 
The results are displayed in table 2, with the ( standardised) value of 
persistence and the ranking of each coun try appearing in the cells . Although 
the standardisation hides this fact , we should stress that for most countries 
the degree of persistence is extremely high . Regarding the measures , there 
exist important differences between them , although the ranking position is 
quite stable. Only for medium-range persistence ( France, for instance) are 
there significant changes in ranking since in that range the differences 
between the countries are very small. 
3 . 3 . -Results 
Before presenting our results, it is convenient to make some remarks 
about the nature of our data set. Firstly, each measure is subject to 
important limitations: inflation measures are just sample approximations, 
since the series are non-stationary; persistence values are not free from 
problem s ,  as we have pointed out; finally, the ordinal CBI measure of an 
ordinal nature will be compared with two cardinal measures. Secondly, cross­
section analysis implies a small number of observations ( 1 9  in total) . Both 
factors advise caution in the interpretation of our results. 
In Chart 1 we present the regression of average inflation against CBl 
with the corresponding 95% confidence bands . Below the chart appear , the 
Mea regression results , with the corresponding t-ratios and R2 �hich are 
extremely high. The relationship is robustly negative , as theory predicts. 
Similarly, chart 2 presents the regression of inflation against persistence. 
The sign is positive as the model predicts , but the parameter is only 
marginally significant. The link between inflation and persistence is thus 
quite weak J and this is reflected in a low R2 . Germany and the DM-zone 
countries are important outliers , presenting low inflation relative to their 
degree of persistence, as is Italy J which represents the opposite case. 
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R� 0.15 
The main objective of our exercise is to test whether the Barra-Gordon 
model with unemployment persistence better explains the inflationary process 
than its simpler, no persistence version. Thus , the extended model will be 
endorsed by the data if , when considering persistence , the explanatory 
power of the regression -measured by ( corrected) R] is significantly 
improved relative to our initial regression. The results are as follows: 
n, = 1 1 . 6  -0.45 CBI + 1 . 24 e 
( -3 . 35 )  ( 0 . 56) 
R' = 0 . 44 
LR= . 04 ( 3 . 84 )  
The corrected R2 decreases. Furthermore , the t-ratio associated with the 
degree of persistence dramatically decreases. In order to test more formally 
the extended model we have applied a Likelihood ratio test (LR) which allows 
the two models to be compared. Its value indicates that the restricted model 
(with no persistence) cannot be rejected by the data ( the value of the chi­
square, beyond which the restricted model would be rejected, is given in 
brackets ) .  Therefore , the results of this regression not only reject the 
model, but they reveal that the link between inflation and persistence may 
be due to the fact that persistence and independence are somehow related. 
Chart 3 presents the relationship between the two variables. A 
significant negative correlation between persistence and CBI inay be 
observed ( correlation coefficient 0 . 44) . This fact reconciles the significance 
of the persistence parameter when regressed alone on inflation and its lack 
of significance when the regression includes CSI. Apart from the afore 
mentioned measurement problems with the data, these results could be 
criticised because of the non-linearity of the regression implied by the model 
(equation (6» . We have, consequently, performed some non-linear 
transformations in the regressions but none has substantially improved the 
results of the regression .  
For completeness , we have repeated the exercise with the sample 
variance of inflation; the signs of the parameters should be the same as when 
using the sample mean, namely, a negative correlation of inflation variance 
- 1 7  -
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(0 .. 2) with CBI and a positive correlation with persistence!71• The results are 
indeed very similar to those obtained with the mean . 
4. -CONCLUSIONS 
Introducing persistence in unemployment has allowed us to evaluate 
jointly two fundamental sources of the inflationary process: monetary factors 
and the characteristics of the labour market. 
The model of monetary policy which we have used in this work reveals 
that the inflationary bias disappears only when there is no persistence since, 
as we have remarked, not even a completely independent central bank would 
choose to exclude unemployment from its loss function . This fact would 
suggest that a successful antinflationary strategy rests on Central Bank 
independence but it must be complemented with reforms in the labour market 
in order to reduce rigidites in wages and persistence in unemployment. 
However, empirical testing of the extended model turned out to be 
unsatisfactory .  Adding persistence in unemployment to the original and 
indeed very robust inflation-CBI cross-country regression is irrelevant from 
a statistical point of view. The underlying model implicitly assumes that eBI 
and persistence are unrelated variables. This assumption is challenged by 
the empirical evidence which uncovers a significant negative correlation 
between these two variables. Moreover, this correlation was behind the 
empirical rejection of the model. 
These results notwithstanding, the negative correlation between CBI and 
persistence may enhance, albeit through alternative channels, the 
importance of persistence in the explanation of inflationary process�s and, 
The results of the regressions using the variance are the following :  
a,
' 
= 3 0 . 9  - 1 . 5 8  eBI R' = 0. 27 
( - 2 . 78) 
0,' = 7 . 69 + 20. 72 6 R' = 0. 1 5  
(2. 08) 
a,
' = 23 . 54 - 1 . 26 eBI + 1 1 . 66 R' = 0 . 28 
( - 2 . 02) ( 1 . 1 3) 
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at the same time, it raises some intriguing normative issues . More precisely , 
we could think that eBI and labour market flexibility are indeed related in 
practice. In other words , we wish to stress that the ability of the 
government to generate inflationary surprises may not be irrelevant for the 
functioning of labour market adjustment mechanisms. 
In what follows we develop this hypothesis . First of all, it should be 
recalled that unemployment persistence is positively related to wage 
rigidityl�l, which is in turn determined by the institutional mechanisms in 
the labour market (in our case the existence of an insider-outsider 
framework) .  We could then advance two alternative interpretations of the 
observed correlation between persistence and eBI. 
On the one hand, we might think than the lower the eBI, the more 
reluctant trade unions will be to make wage mechanisms more flexible (and 
thus, to induce reductions in unemployment persistence ) ,  since the 
government could take advantage of this to curtail real wages in order to 
boost employment . In this respect, we should emphasise that, both 
theoretically and empirically. lower eBI is also associated with greater 
inflation volatility .  The rational response of trade unions to prevent inflation 
variability generating real wage variability is to protect themselves through 
rigid wages. 
On the other hand, it could alternatively be thought that the more rigid 
wages are, the lower the incentive for governments to delegate monetary 
policy to an independent CBI j since labour markets are unable to adjust 
through price changes on their own. unanticipated inflation becomes an 
extremely useful instrument to curb unemployment in the short run", so that 
governments are reluctant to surrender it . 
Unfortunately, our cross-country analysis does not allow us to explore 
in which direction causality runs and therefore we are not able to ascertain 
IHI_We have confirmed this result empirically by comparing our persistence 
measures with the measures of wage rigidity obtained by Layard et a!. ( 1 91)  
and Vinals and Jimeno ( 1996) . The correlation coefficienta are 0.36 and 0.26 , 
respectively.  
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which interpretation is more accurate. An alternative empirical framework 
would be necessary for this . From a theoretical point of view, the revealed 
interdependence between the variables should be incorporated into the 
model. In our framework .l.. is a variable determined by the government so 
that it would be relatively easy to think of .l.. as an increasing function of the 
degree of persistence 8. However, the analysis would become more complex 
if we assumed that the degree of wage rigidity (and 8) is a function of the 
degree of Central Bank independence , since in this case the decision 
variables for the trade unions would be two: the level of nominal wages and 
6. 
From a normative point of view, it is important which is the right 
interpretation because it allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of delegating 
monetary policy to an independent Central Bank. The most favourable 
interpretation is the following: if the institutional change brings about more 
flexibility in wages, reducing unemployment persistence labour market, the 
inflationary gains would be further increased. Therefore, the antinflationary 
effects of Central Bank independence would be enhance by the induced 
effects on the functioning of the labour markets. By contrast, if causality 
ran the other way, delegation would entail lower inflation gains, since the 
institutional change would not affect the underlying inflationary mechanisms 
in the labour market. 
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ANNEX 
Central B ank Independence 
As pointed out by Fernandez de Lis (1996) , the construction of indices 
of central bank independence runs up against major practical obstacles : 
- First, the concept of independence is not clearly defined, so that its 
measurement will depend on the definition adopted . 
- Second, the interpretation and standardisation of legal questions on 
which the indices are based and their subsequent aggregation are highly 
subjective .  
- Finally, periods must b e  chosen with a certain degree of stability as 
regards the legal questions affecting the central bank, but also sufficiently 
long to be empirically relevant. 
Despite these problems some authors have prepared measures of 
independence for use in empirical studies . The main aspects on which the 
various measures of independence have been based may be grouped into: 
1 .  Questions relating to legal or statutory independence , of which two 
types can be distinguished: those relating to political independence ( the 
formal dependence of the central bank , its objectives , the features of its 
governing bodies etc . ) ;  and those relating to economic independence 
( everything relating to the financing of the government) . 
2 .  Questions relating to actual independence, which attempt to quantify 
the extent to which the central bank is in practice more or less independent 
than its statutes state. 
A brief description follows of the indices most widely used : 
BADE & PARKIN ( 1 988) [BPI 
Aspects considered : 
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• Is the central bank the ultimate monetary authority? 
Are there government representatives on the bank's council? 
Are there appointments which the government does not control? 
Each question has two possible answers , which gives six possible 
permutations.  Each question is given the same weight.  
It  analyses the period 1972-1986 for 1 2  countries . 
ALESINA (1989) [A] 
It uses the three Bade & Parkin criteria and adds a fourth : 
Is the central bank obliged to purchase short-term Treasury debt? 
This question also has two possible answers and is included in the measure 
with the same weight as the other three . 
It analyses the period 1972-1986 for 1 7  countries . 
GRILLI, MASCIANDARO & TABELLINJ (1991) [GMT] 
They prepare two measures , one which attempts to measure political 
independence [GMT ( P ) ]  and the other economic independence [GMT ( E ) ] .  
The degree of political independence i s  determined using eight criteria: 
Is the governor appointed by parliament? 
Is his term of office more than 5 years? 
Is the whole council appointed by the government? 
• Is the council's term of office more than 5 years? 
Is there any obligation for the government to be represented on the 
council? 
Is it necessary for the government to approve monetary policy? 
Is the bank required by its statutes to pursue price stability? 
Are there legal provisions to clarify the position of the bank in the event 
of conflict with the government? 
The index of economic independence is based on another eight criteria: 
Are there any automatic credit facilities? 
Are market interest rates applied to direct credit facilities? 
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Are these facilities temporary? 
Does the central bank participate in the primary public debt market? 
Is the discount rate determined by the central bank? 
• Is banking supervision a function of the central bank? 
Is banking supervision exclusively a matter for the bank? 
Each entry can take two values and in both cases they all have the same 
weight . 
It analyses the period 1950-1989 for 1 8  countries . 
CUKIERMAN ( 1992) [CUKI 
Cukierman prepares three measures, the first attempts to measure legal 
independence [CUK(L)] and the other two the gaps between legal and actual 
independence [CUK(Q) , [CUK(T) I .  
Cukierman's legal independence index is based on four groups of legal 
characteristics represented by several variables which take values between 
o and 1: 
1 .  The governor's appointment, removal and term of office : 
How long is his term of office? 
Who appoints the governor? 
Who removes the governor? 
Can the governor perform other duties in the government? 
2 .  Policy formulation: 
Who formulates monetary policy? 
Who has the last word in the event of conflict? 
What is the bank's role in the government budget? 
3. Central bank objectives.  
4. Limits on the central bank's capacity to lend to the public sector : 
• Limits on advances 
Limits on securities lending 
Lending terms 
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Potential borrowers from the bank 
Definition of these limits 
Maturity of loans 
Interest rates on loans 
Prohibition on central bank participation in the primary government debt 
market. 
The second measure reflects governor turnover. It measures the difference 
between the legal and actual duration of the governor's term of office. 
The third measure is based on the replies of specialists on monetary policy 
in the respective countries to a questionnaire to identify the factors causing 
divergence between what the central bank's statutes say monetary policy 
should be and what happens in practice. 
The questions included in this questionnaire are: 
The overlap between the governor's and the government's terms of office 
Limits on lending to the government in practice 
Conflict resolution 
Who determines the central bank's budget? 
Who determines the wages of senior officials and the distribution of 
profits? 
Are there any money supply targets? 
• Are there any formal or informal interest rate targets? 
• What is the effective priority given to price stability? 
Does the central bank operate as a development bank granting loans at 
subsidised rates? 
Both for the legal independence index and for that based on the 
questionnaire Cukierman proposes two measures, one in which all points have 
the same weight and another in which the weights vary . 
Period of analysis: 
The legal index and the turnover one are prepared for the period 1950-
1989 and for four sub-periods: 1950-59 , 1960-71, 1972-79 and 1 980-89. 
• The index based on the questionnaire refers solely to the last sub-period 
( 1980-89) . 
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Number of countries included: 
• The legal index is prepared for 68 countries. 
The turnover index for 58 countries . 
The index based on the questionnaire for 24 countries. 
HAAN & STURM ( 1 992) [HS] 
Aspects considered: 
• This measure is based on all the entries in the Grilli (91)  tables ( political 
and economic independence), except those relating to banking system 
supervision. 
Method of computation: The same weights are used. 
It  analyses the period 1959-1989 for 18 countries. 
EIJFFINGER & SCHALLING (1993) [ES] 
This is an asymmetric index in the sense that the first question has three 
possible answers and the other two only two: 
• Is the central bank solely responsible for monetary policy? Is this 
responsibility shared or does the bank have no influence at all? 
Are there government representatives on the bank's council? 
• Is more than half of the council appointed independently of the 
government? 
It analyses the period 1950-89 for 12 countries in an initial study. In a 
later study by Eijffinger & Van Keulen ( 1995) the number of countries for 
which this measure is calculated is increased by 11 . 
In view of the variety of criteria considered by each index we propose 
preparing an index of indices to capture in some way the different aspects 
considered by each index individually. When preparing this measure, we 
encounter a number of practical problems, such as the fact that the various 
classifications have different criteria and scales, and that the country 
coverage of the various indices differs. 
Mindful of these problems , we have taken the following steps when 
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preparing our measure : 
1 .  For each meas,ure of independence ,  we take the original values 
assigned to the countries in our sample , rank the countries from less to more 
independent, and then replace the original values with the corresponding 
ordinal numbers (the higher the number the greater the independence) , 
Often several countries have the same value, since they are normally discrete 
measures which can take less values than the number of countries in the 
sample, In this case ,  f-allowing Fernandez de Lis, they are all assigned the 
value of the median of the interval they form in the classification. 
2. The number of countries considered by each measure differs so that 
we have different ranges for the different measures. This may lead to 
distortion when preparing an aggregate measure , in the sense that the 
positions of countries in the lowest positions are distorted upwards solely 
due to their appearing in classifications covering fewer countries. To avoid 
this we have h(;mogenised the measures so that all of them have the same 
range from 1 to N, N being the total number of countries in our sample. This 
transformation is carried out as follows: 
Let II, be the number of countries in our sample for which we have the 
measure i. Each measure will take values from 1 to Il; although in practice this 
will only be the case when no countries take the same value.  Thus , if 
measure i takes values ViP j=l, . . . ,11;, with intervals of unit width, the 
rescaled values of the index 61j will take values between 1 and N in intervals 
of width d, where: 
d,; (N-I)f(n,-l) 
such that: 
where it is observed that 
vij=l � vij=l; Vij=1lt � vij=Nj l�v'j�N 
and the distance between each value (given by dl) is constant. 
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3 . - We calculate the simple mean of the various homogenised measures. 
Persistence 
To measure persistence, the literature offers two theoretical approaches: 
the gain function, proposed by Campbell and Mankiw, and the limit of the 
variance ratio proposed by Cochrane. 
The Campbell and Mankiw approach is based on the following argument. 
Assuming that the series Xj has a unit root, its representation in MA form 
would be: 
.6.Xt=�+ E q,/t-j j-O 
[A.I] 
It is inferred from equation [11 that the impact of a shock in period t 
(where the shock is represented by E1) on the level of series in period t+k 
will be given by L<p� (since E, will have affected the increase in the series in 
t J t+ 1 ,  t+2, ... , t+k); therefore, the long-term impact of a shock in a 
specific time period will be captured by the gain function of the increase in 
the series <p ( 1 ) , where: 
[A.2] 
If the series shows no persistence (e. g. white noise), the gain function will 
be close to 0; if the series shows persis tence (e. g. random walk) the gain 
function will be close to 1 ;  and if the series had more than one unit root the 
gain function would tend to infinity. 
The Cochrane approach is perhaps less intuitive than that of Campbell 
and Mankiw. It is based on the limit of a "variance ratio" defined as: 
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v _ ..,.v,,..,a,_{ �-,,x=-- T,--) 
K kVar{�x,) 
[ A .3] 
The underlying argument is as follows: if c:P (1) behaves in a stationary way, 
the variance of the series differentiated k times tends to a constant, while 
if the series behaves as a random walk, this variance grows linearly with k ;  
hence the limit of equation [ A. 3 ]  will tend to zero or one depending on 
whether the series follows a stationary or random-walk process, 
respectively!')) . 
From the theoretical measures it is proposed to derive three empirical 
measures of persistence: 
·ARlMA: Campbell and Mankiw ( 1 987) propose obtaining the gain 
function of the increase in the series <1> ( 1) by estimating the ARMA (p,q) 
process that generates the first difference of the series and approximating 
<I> ( 1 )  by the ratio of the estimated polynomial of the MA part to that of the AR 
part, with both evaluated at L=l .  That is to say, let Axtl be a stationary 
linear process whose estimated ARMA( p , q) representation is as follows: 
[ A .4] 
Where <I> ( L) and B ( L) are two polynomials of a generic order in L. The 
circumflex reflects the fact that they are estimates . 
If we express [ 4 ]  in MA form, that gives : 
[A.S] 
'''' A simple demonstration of these results can be found in Mills ( 1 993), 
pp. 77-78. 
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Whence an estimation of the gain function would be the polynomials ratio in 
L=J: 
�(l) = ;'-1(1) B(L) 
'V20: The limit of Cochrane's variance ratio can be estimated taking into 
account the result that Cochrane (1988) derives: 
V=lim._Y.=1 +2L Pj 
;-1 
I A . 7 ]  
Where P j is the rh autocorrelation coefficient . Thus , calculating the sample 
autocorrelation function we can obtain an estimation of the limit of the 
variance ratio V. 
The so-called "window size" problem arises in this measure, as it does in 
the following. The problem involves our not knowing the number of sample 
autocorrelations necessary to estimate the infinite sum appearing in [A . 7 ] .  
Drawing on Montecarlo simulations , Campbell and Mankiw propose taking a 
number of sample autocorrelations equal to one-third of the sample. In our 
case this number is 20, hence our names V20 and A20 for this and the 
following measures , respectively. 
'A20: Cochrane derives a relationship between the limit of the variance 
ratio V and the gain function 4> ( 1 )  . If we call R' = J - [Var(E,) /Var( ax,), it can 
be shown that: 
4>(1)= � V 
I -R' 
I A . S ]  
On this basis , Campbell and Mankiw ( 1 987) propose using the result by 
replacing R' in [8] by the square of the first sample autocorrelation of the 
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increase in the series and replacing V by its derived estimation in [A. 7 ] .  
Specifically, then, we have three practical measures of persistence that 
are valid for our purposes , these being summarised in [A.6 ] ,  [ A. 7 ]  and 
( A. 8 ]  . None is free from problems . The disadvantage with the measure based 
on the ARIMA estimation of the stochastic process generating the increase in 
the series is that this type of estimation has been designed in a short-run 
forecasting context. The measures V20 and A20 based on the variance ratio 
defined by Cochrane have the aforementioned window size problem. 
The estimation of the ARIMA model necessary for IA. 6 ]  has been carried 
out with the SEATS econometric package. 
Regarding the mean of the persistence measures , a mean between the 
ARIMA and A20 measures has been calculated previously since they are 
estimates of the same theoretical factor, and with this mean and the V20 
measure a final mean has been produced. 
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